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Vietnam has been following China’s path closely and very successfully for the last two decades, since the 
adoption of ‘Doi moi’ in 1986. Over those last two decades, economic growth rates in both countries have 
been the highest worldwide (with GDP growing by 8 per cent and 10 per cent per year, respectively). The 
increase of the Vietnamese share of world trade is the highest of all major Asian exporters (including 
China) since the mid-1990s. In the current international context, doubts have been raised by some 
economists concerning the possibility for new Asian countries to take-off and join the group of emerging 
countries. Several obstacles might block this emergence, such as the rise of China and the stringent rules 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper addresses this question with regard to Vietnam, who 
joined the WTO at the beginning of 2007: we study Vietnam’s potential for sustainable growth and 
international integration. We start by briefly describing economic reform and trade policies in Vietnam, 
and their results in terms of economic growth and world integration. We then analyse Vietnamese trade 
specialization and the bilateral relationship with China. Finally, we assess the competition between 
Vietnam and China on world markets, and show that the export structures are very different. Both 
countries have benefited from a boom in their textile and clothing exports following the cessation of 
quotas (in the case of China) and the signing of USBTA (in the case of Vietnam). For Vietnam, reducing 
the specialization in textiles and clothing, and joining the Asian production network in electronics, 
represents a major challenge. 
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1 Introduction 
Rapid industrialization is the major characteristic of East Asian economic development. 
It has been accelerated by export orientation and a specialization pattern that has 
evolved from simple products (for example, garments, shoes, toys, and so on) to more 
sophisticated products. Countries have been involved in a catch-up process in line with 
their comparative advantage. According to Okita (1985), the great diversity among the 
Asian nations in their stages of development and resource endowments ‘works to 
facilitate the flying geese pattern of shared development as each is able to take 
advantage of its distinctiveness to develop with a supportive division of labour’.   
The ‘flight of wild geese’ image has acquired different meanings over time. It was first 
used to describe the life cycle of industries (Akamatsu 1962); it has been successively 
extended to the evolution of industrial structure, then to the shift of industries from one 
country to another. According to this latter meaning, as Japan and the other East Asian 
countries leave industries in which they have no comparative advantage, countries that 
industrialized later are able to move into these industries and join the ‘flying geese’ 
formation. The textiles and clothing industry offers an example of the shift of industries 
in Asia, from Japan to Hong Kong/Korea, and then to Malaysia/ the Philippines/ 
Thailand and now to China/ Vietnam, and so on.  
This model was helpful to describe Asian development during recent decades, and the 
successive emergence of Japan, followed by the ‘Dragons’ (Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan) and the ‘Tigers’ (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 
and so on). Three major evolutions have made this transition process more difficult and 
might provoke a major disruption in the ‘flight of wild geese’: 
•  First, Asian development came to a halt in 1997 because of the Asian crisis, with a 
long-term impact in some countries. While Korea was able to grow out of the crisis 
very rapidly, Indonesia was the major victim and Thailand is still having difficulties 
moving from middle-income to high-income status.  
•  Second, economic emergence has become more difficult as China has fully joined 
the ‘flight’ and has been rapidly moving up the value chain. Indeed, the pace of 
China’s growth has accelerated since the Asian crisis, while that of other Asian 
emerging countries has slowed down compared with their pre-crisis performances. 
•  Third, the new trade rules imposed by the WTO have been considered as an obstacle 
to the integration of new emerging countries in the world economy; according to 
Chang (2002), developed countries have ‘kicked away the ladder’ of economic 
development (Korea and the other dragons would not have been allowed to pursue 
the industrial policies that contributed to their success story). Moreover, the end of 
clothing quotas mostly benefited China and had a negative impact on other 
developing countries. 
Following Eichengreen (2004), several studies (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Eichengreen 
and Tong 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz 2006; Ravenhill 2006) have tried to assess the 
impact of China’s economic growth on Asian middle-income emerging countries. They 
concluded that it was positive, as most of these countries were able to adjust to the 
Chinese threat. But, to our knowledge, the impact of China’s economic emergence on 
its low-income neighbours has not been assessed yet, although it is most probably of a   2
different nature. Studying this impact is all the more important, as it can present some 
answers concerning the possibility of new Asian countries emerging in the current 
international economic context.  
In this paper, in order to study Vietnam’s potential for sustainable growth and 
international integration, we focus on international trade and the trade relationship 
between Vietnam and China. Our paper draws on international foreign trade databases 
and uses traditional indicators of trade specialization and competition.  
In the first section, we describe Vietnamese economic reform (especially trade policies), 
and its results in terms of economic growth and world integration. The subsequent 
section studies Vietnam’s trade specialization and the bilateral relationship with China. 
This is followed by an assessment of the competition between Vietnam and China on 
world markets, and an analysis of the particular case of textiles and clothing, which, 
historically, was the initial basis of the industrialization process. 
2  Vietnam is the latest Asian emerging economy 
Vietnam is a neighbour of China, and Vietnam’s capital Hanoi is less than 1000 
kilometres from Hong Kong and Guangzhou (Canton). Both countries share many 
cultural values (Confucianism), as well as a common history: until the signature of the 
Treaty of Tientsin with France hardly more than a century ago (1885), China had 
suzerain rights and sovereignty over Vietnam (and the Indo-China peninsula). Vietnam 
also used Chinese ideograms up until the early twentieth century.1 Since independence 
(1945), Vietnam has maintained a close political and economic relationship with China 
(only interrupted, temporarily, from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s). 
Finally, China and Vietnam are among the last countries in the world where the 
communist party still has a monopoly of power. 
It is therefore unsurprising that economic reform in Vietnam followed that of China 
relatively closely: facing economic difficulties, both countries had to adopt some 
principles of market economy. Although reform in Vietnam was (as in the case of 
China) gradual, results came quickly in terms of economic growth and integration in the 
world economy. 
2.1  Vietnam’s Doi moi followed China’s reform 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Vietnam faced alarming economic difficulties: acute 
shortage of basic consumer goods (even for staple food products), growing external 
debt, increasing macro-economic imbalances (inflation, public sector and trade deficits) 
and a slowdown of economic growth. 
In December 1986 – eight years after China (December 1978) – Vietnam reacted by 
embarking on a radical reform programme called ‘Doi moi’ (‘Change and Newness’) 
that marked the adoption of ‘market socialism’ (Figure 1). As in China, the reforms 
                                                 
1  At the beginning of the twentieth century, Vietnam abandoned Chinese ideograms and shifted to the 
Latin alphabet.   3
started in the rural areas where agriculture was virtually decollectivized, farmers were 
given more autonomy, and prices were liberalized. A private sector was authorized, 
consisting mainly of small and medium-sized enterprises. Major elements of central 
planning were dismantled. 
The external liberalization process was also very rapid. The state monopoly of foreign 
trade was abandoned. Tariff exemptions were introduced for inputs used in the 
production of export goods; the non-tariff barriers were reduced. Progress was made in 
a number of areas, including reduction in maximum import tariff rates, the 
implementation of tariff reductions associated with membership of ASEAN (in 1997), 
and so on. 
Since the adoption of Doi moi, and following the East Asian ‘Dragons’ model (World 
Bank 1993), Vietnamese trade policy has mixed import substitution measures and 
export subsidies to promote an export led growth strategy. As had previously been the 
case in East Asian emerging countries (Amsden 2001), export subsidies have played a 
key role in the export surge, especially for textile and clothing products. 
Following the end of the US embargo in 1993, Vietnam speeded up its process of 
international integration. Three trade agreements have had a major impact on trade 
liberalization and increased market access: 
•  After joining ASEAN, tariffs on imports from ASEAN countries were reduced to 
below 5 per cent in 2006 under the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). This tariff 
reduction was also applied by other ASEAN countries to Vietnamese exports, which 
benefited from improved market access in the area. 
•  In 2000, Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement (USBTA) with the United 
States, opening the doors of the American market to Vietnamese products 
(submitted to quotas). As Vietnam’s exports to the US have been granted most 
favoured nation (MFN) status since 2002, the average tariff on Vietnamese imports 
into the USA dropped from some 40 per cent to 3–4 per cent. 
•  Vietnam eventually joined the WTO at the beginning of 2007 (five years after 
China), almost exactly 20 years after the adoption of Doi moi. As it is now a 
member of the WTO, Vietnam benefits from the MFN status in all member 
countries (which also means that quotas will no longer be applied to Vietnamese 
exports) and has to apply WTO rules. Consequently, the MFN tariff will be reduced, 
on average, to below 15 per cent by 2019 and the maximum tariff applied will 
decrease from 150 per cent to 85 per cent (IMF 2007). However, after its accession 
to the WTO, Vietnam will not be immune from new trade frictions as it is 
considered (as is China, also) to be a ‘non-market economy’. 
2.2  Vietnam has received increasing flows of FDI 
Although financial liberalization has been slow and modest, Vietnam has received 
important foreign funding: according to the balance of payment figures, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) amounts to around US$2 billion per year (that is, 4 per cent of GDP) 
and Development Aid to around US$1.5 billion per year. FDI comes mostly from Asian 
countries (Table 1): the first five foreign investors (Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Korea,   4
and Hong Kong) contributed to nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of total disbursed 
investment up until 2006. 
FDI has become a significant contributor to domestic investment (more than 10 per cent 
of gross investment) and exports, and picked up with the completion of the WTO 
negotiation. Up until 2000, the oil and gas sectors were the principal recipients of FDI 
but, since then, light and heavy industries have received the lion’s share. 
For Asian firms, Vietnam is increasingly perceived as an alternative to China with 
regard to labour-intensive industries. It is notably the case for Japanese multinationals: 
Vietnam ranks third in their intentions for investment behind India and China, according 
to the 2006 annual survey of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, as well as 
Taiwanese firms. Labour costs in Vietnam are slightly lower than in China and both 
countries share the same work ethics. Compared with low-income countries, Vietnam 
also has an excellent education record: the primary completion rate is almost 100 per 
cent and the secondary school enrolment ratio is as high as 76 per cent (World Bank 
2007). 
2.3  An export boom sustained by foreign firms 
In Vietnam, economic and export growth rates have been impressive: since the mid-
1980s, GDP has grown at the rate of nearly 8 per cent per year and foreign trade has 
expanded at the rate of nearly 20 per cent per year (the respective figures for China are 
9 per cent and 15 per cent per year). For the last two decades, Vietnam and China have 
been the fastest growing Asian economies.2 Thanks to the low level of its financial 
openness, Vietnam was relatively spared from the 1997 crisis. As the dollar has been 
depreciating since 2003, Vietnamese competitiveness has been helped by an exchange 
rate policy that follows an implicit peg to the US$. At the national level, between 1993 
and 2004 the proportion of the population living in poverty was considerably reduced 
from 54 per cent to 24 per cent. 
The growth of the Vietnamese share of the world market for goods has been remarkable 
since the mid-1980s, even when compared with China (Figure 2). Its growth is by far 
the most dynamic of all Asian exporters (although the current level of 0.3 per cent is far 
behind Thailand’s market share of 1 per cent and, of course, China’s 8 per cent). The 
Vietnamese market share on the world and EU markets has almost tripled between 1995 
and 2004. The ratio is 14 on the US market, where Vietnamese exports were totally 
insignificant in 1995 (as the US embargo had only ended in 1993). The gain on the 
Japanese market is important but much lower than that on the European market. 
According to the General Statistical Office, foreign investors (which are mostly Asian) 
exported a total value of US$22.8 billion in 2006 (including oil); that is, 57 per cent of 
total exports. Foreign firms export over 50 per cent of total garment exports (this share 
is probably even larger in the case of electronics). The role of export processing is 
                                                 
2  Some other small countries in other continents have also registered very high growth rates (for 
example, Equatorial Guinea). But these growth rates are based on one commodity only (oil, in this 
case).   5
similar to that in China, where Asian subsidiaries account for around 50 per cent of total 
exports (Gaulier et al. 2005). 
The structure of exports has also changed dramatically in recent years. Since 2002, 
manufactured products have contributed to the majority of exports (Figure 3). This 50 
per cent threshold was reached by the Philippines in 1984, by China in 1986, by 
Thailand and Malaysia in 1989, and by Indonesia in 1995. Being an oil exporter (as is 
Indonesia, but on a smaller scale) tends to reduce the share of manufactured exports. 
However, crude oil exports will go down in the next few years as Vietnam is building 
oil refineries for domestic consumption. 
3  Vietnam still has the trade specialization of a low-income country 
In spite of its rapid progress, Vietnam is still in the early stages of industrialization and 
international integration. The study of its trade specialization conducted in this section 
confirms this situation. Contrary to other Asian emerging countries, Vietnam is not yet 
part of the Asian production network (except, to a certain extent, in clothing), which is 
dominated by China. Its trade with China corresponds to a ‘South–North’ trade pattern: 
it exports raw materials and imports manufactured products from its sizeable neighbour. 
3.1  Vietnam is building up new comparative advantages 
The specialization in Vietnamese foreign trade is analyzed here using the indicators of 
revealed comparative advantage, drawn from Balassa (1965). The advantage of using 
these indicators is that we do not restrict ourselves to analyzing the breakdown of 
Vietnamese trade independently from the rest of the world, but we analyze Vietnam’s 
specialization relatively to the structure of world trade.  
Vietnamese specialization, which is highly concentrated on a few products, is 
characteristic of a low-income country rich in natural resources (Table 2): oil (20 per 
cent of its exports in 2004, according to CEPII/Chelem) is its first comparative 
advantage, followed by textile and clothing products (shoes, followed by clothing and 
knitwear) and by meat products. On the import side, refined oil is the first comparative 
disadvantage (12 per cent of imports), followed by yarn and fabric used by the textiles 
and clothing industry, and by other intermediate products (iron and steel, plastic 
products) and specialized machinery. 
Among Asian emerging countries, Vietnam’s specialization is only comparable to 
Indonesia’s (Table 3). All the other countries participate in the Asian electronic regional 
network and, therefore, have a strong revealed comparative advantage in electronic and 
computer products. Only China, Indonesia, and the Philippines are still specializing in 
clothing products, whereas the more advanced economies (Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
and Thailand) have moved up the ladder. 
Chinese specialization is much more diversified than the Vietnamese. Exports, contrary 
to Vietnam, do not rely on raw materials at all: the comparative advantages are found in 
computers, other manufactured products, and textiles and clothing (shoes, clothing, and 
knitwear, in the same order as Vietnam). The comparative disadvantages correspond to 
inputs for the computer industry (electronic components), raw materials (crude oil),   6
specialized machinery, and other intermediate products (chemical organic and plastic 
products). 
In both countries, the evolution of trade specialization over the last two decades is 
striking: 
•  Vietnam has built up its revealed comparative advantages in textile and clothing 
from scratch (in knitwear but not in clothing, which already existed at the end of the 
1980s). This is also the case for shoes and for furniture. Inversely, the specialization 
of exports in agricultural products has been progressively reduced. As Vietnam has 
started producing pharmaceutical products, the relative weight of this product in 
imports has also strongly decreased. 
•  China already had a specialization in textiles and clothing two decades ago but did 
not export any computers, electronic products, or telecommunication equipment: the 
specialization in these products has increased progressively. 
3.2  Bilateral trade with China follows a South–North pattern 
In 2004, China became the first supplier to Vietnam and its fourth client.3 According to 
Vietnam’s trade statistics, total bilateral trade amounted to US$7.5 billion in 2006 (the 
real amount is larger due to widespread smuggling). Applying a gravity model taking 
into account usual variables (the distance between the two countries, the size of their 
economies, and so on), Tumbarello (2006) shows that bilateral trade is in line with the 
amount predicted by the model. Bilateral trade is expected to double and rise to US$15 
billion in 2010.4 
Vietnam’s bilateral trade with China shares three common characteristics with its least 
developed country neighbours (LDCs) (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar):  
•  In contrast to middle-income Asian countries which all enjoy a large surplus in their 
trade with China, Vietnam (as well as these other LDCs’ neighbours) runs a trade 
deficit with China. According to Vietnam’s trade statistics, this bilateral deficit 
amounted to US$3 billions in 2006 (4 per cent of GDP), and the ratio of exports to 
imports was 41 per cent. The deficit has sharply increased over time. In 2001, the 
bilateral trade was still almost balanced (the deficit amounted to US$ 200 millions 
only, and the export/import ratio to 87 per cent). 
•  In Vietnam, as in Cambodia and Myanmar (but not in Laos, where Thailand is the 
largest supplier), China is by far the first supplier. This is not the case for middle-
income Asian countries, where China’s market share is much smaller; 
•  Finally, as is the case for Cambodia, Vietnam’s export structure to China is different 
from the structure of its world exports. Indeed, manufactured goods represent a 
small percentage of Vietnamese exports to China (18 per cent), much inferior to the 
                                                 
3  Bilateral trade was completely marginal when both countries re-established diplomatic relations in 
1991. 
4  Vietnam and China joint press communiqué on 19 May 2007 
(http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2007/05/696637).   7
share of these products in Vietnam’s total world exports (Figure 4); the same 
discrepancy is observed in the case of Cambodia and Bangladesh which are both 
LDCs. 
This third characteristic is in sharp contrast to the structure of trade between other Asian 
countries and China. The low flow and the structure of Chinese investment in Vietnam 
is consistent with this characteristic. Although China is the largest supplier to Vietnam, 
its share of FDI in Vietnam is low and Chinese FDI is concentrated in natural resources.  
The imbalance of bilateral trade reflects a division of labour that is usually observed in 
trade relationships between low-income countries and developed countries. As shown in 
Table 4, Vietnam mainly exports raw products to China: oil, minerals, agricultural 
products, rubber, and so on. In return, it imports mainly processed and manufactured 
products from China: refined oil, yarn, and fabric used as input for its clothing industry, 
other intermediate products, and machinery. 
This analysis of trade specialization and bilateral trade with China confirms that 
Vietnam is not (yet?) part of the Asian production network in which China plays a 
central role. This network is characterized by two main elements: on the one hand, an 
increasing vertical specialization, corresponding to the splitting up of the value added 
chain); on the other hand, a growing importance in intra-Asian flows of trade of 
intermediate goods (mostly parts and components), especially for electronic products 
(Gaulier et al. 2005). However, this situation will probably evolve once the recent large 
projects in the electronics sector come on stream. 
3.3  The uncertain impact of the FTA with China 
In 2004, ASEAN and China signed a free trade agreement (ACFTA), which will be 
implemented by most participants in 2010, and by the new ASEAN member countries, 
including Vietnam, in 2015. Some ‘early harvest’ agreements have been signed by 
China with is partners (mostly for agricultural goods), especially with Vietnam. 
The impact of the ACFTA on Vietnam is somewhat uncertain (Nguyen and Tran 2007; 
Vo 2005). The FTA will stimulate bilateral trade with China. It will create a huge 
market of 1.7 billion people, which will attract foreign investment and might bring 
dynamic gains from trade. But, in comparison with China, Vietnam might become less 
attractive for FDI. Competition with China will increase and there is a risk of Vietnam 
exploiting its static comparative advantage in labour (and natural resources) and falling 
into a ‘low-waged labour trap’. 
One benefit from increased trade integration is already appearing, as huge investments 
in infrastructure (roads, energy, and so on) are being implemented within the regional 
economic corridors (Ishida 2005; MINEFI 2006). Among these new projects, one can 
mention the construction of a new highway between Kunning (China) and Haiphong 
(Vietnam), which will make the Vietnamese harbour play a key role for Southern 
China’s access to foreign markets. Electrical interconnection between China and 
Vietnam is also planned.    8
4  Vietnam and China: more complementary than competitors on industrialized 
markets 
In order to assess the potential for further growth of Vietnamese exports, it is essential 
to measure the degree of competition with China, which has become the third exporter 
of goods in the world (behind Germany and the USA). In this section, we analyze the 
proximity of the Vietnamese export structure with that of China and its evolution, and 
study the particular case of textiles and clothing. 
4.1  Vietnam is making inroads in an increasing number of sectors 
The USA is, by and large, the largest market for both Vietnam and China; they account 
for one-fifth of their exports (respectively 20 per cent and 21 per cent of exports in 
2006, according to Vietnamese and Chinese trade statistics). While the Chinese share of 
the US market increased from 8.9 per cent (2001) to 15.5 per cent (2006), Vietnam’s 
share increased from 0.09 per cent to 0.46 per cent. In order to compare the performance 
of China and Vietnam (and Thailand) on the US market, trade shares have been 
computed for the period 2001 to 2006 at the three-digit industry level.  
Table 5 confirms that China has emerged as a significant exporter across virtually the 
entire spectrum of industries: its share of the US import market has increased in 210 out 
of 263 industries and decreased in only 7. To assess Vietnam’s performance, one has to 
take into account the fact that Vietnamese exports were facing strong trade obstacles up 
until the USBTA came into force in 2002. Nevertheless, Table 5 shows that, between 
2001 and 2006, Vietnam has made inroads on a very large number (175 out of 263) of 
markets. By comparison, Thailand’s market share in the USA increased in 137 markets 
only, and decreased in 33 markets. 
As Vietnamese exports diversify rapidly on the US market, their structure could well be 
rapidly coming to resemble that of China; such evolution might represent a threat for the 
future of Vietnamese exports. In order to appreciate this evolution, we measured the 
proximity of the export structure of China on the US and the UE markets with the 
export structures of Vietnam, Korea and Thailand from 2001 to 2006 (Figure 5). This 
indicator, based on Linnemann (1966), was calculated by desegregating exports 
between 230 products, using the SITC classification at three-digit levels (see 
methodology in Appendix 6.1). 
On both markets, the structures of Vietnamese and Chinese exports are very different, 
but register different evolutions: 
•  On the EU market, the Vietnamese export structure is very much different from the 
Chinese structure, and this difference has not evolved significantly since 2001. 
Vietnam exports mostly shoes (around 50 per cent of total exports) and textile and 
clothing products, whereas China exports mostly electronic and computer products 
together with a relatively small proportion of textile and clothing; the structure of 
Thai exports is nearer to that of China, while Korea is evolving in a different 
manner;   9
•  The evolution is somewhat different on the US market. In 2001, the Vietnamese 
structure used to be rather dissimilar to the Chinese, but appears to be a little closer 
in 2006 (with a cosine of 0.42). This increased proximity is due to the export boom 
of Vietnamese exports of textiles and clothing (which were previously insignificant) 
since the opening of the US market (USBTA). As in the case of the EU market, 
Thailand’s export structure is very near to China’s (with a cosine of 0.8), while 
Korea’s structure is significantly different. 
As stated by Lall and Albaladejo (2004), these similarities, or their absence, reveal 
either a lack of competition or a potential for competition. They do not demonstrate that 
competition actually exists as product categories are still broad (for example, in our 
classification in 230 products, all shoes exports are grouped into one category) and 
might include products that do not compete with each other. Even if the products were 
comparable, it would be possible that countries specialized in differentiated versions. 
Even in the same product, countries may complement each other by performing 
different functions within an integrated production system. 
4.2  Vietnamese and Chinese textile exports are both benefiting from joining the 
WTO and from the cessation of quotas 
As mentioned before, Vietnamese manufactured exports consist mostly of textiles and 
clothing (as well as shoes). This structure is characteristic of a developing country in the 
early stages of its industrialization process. As shown on Figure 6, the share of these 
products in total exports of goods is still growing (the decrease in 2004 was due to 
quotas and has reversed since 2005). This trend is to compare with other major Asian 
exporters, where the share of textiles and clothing in exports peaked around 1985–1990 
and has been progressively declining since then. 
Indeed, as happened with Japan a few decades earlier (and with European countries and 
the USA during the nineteenth-century industrial revolution), textiles and clothing has 
historically been the core industrial sector for all countries starting a take-off process. 
Many reasons explain why this key role is still valid at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century: clothing is the first industrial product consumed, it is a sector that requires light 
investment; the technology is simple; it mostly uses unskilled labour; poor countries 
have a huge supply of cheap labour and, therefore, are the most competitive in this 
labour intensive sector. 
It is therefore important to assess recent Vietnamese performance in this sector together 
with future potential. This is all the more important as international competition has 
increased in this sector following the final dismantling of quotas imposed on Asian 
countries since the beginning of 2005.5  
Having been a member of the WTO since the end of 2001, China appears to be the main 
beneficiary from the cessation of quotas (Table 6): its exports to the EU and the USA 
                                                 
5  The Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFAs) were established in 1974. They imposed quotas on Asian 
exports of textile & clothing to industrialized countries. The Agreement on Textile & Clothing (ATC) 
signed in 1994 organized the progressive dismantling of these quotas during a 10-year period which 
ended at the beginning of 2005.   10
have almost doubled between 2004 and 2006 (despite new restrictions being quickly re-
imposed on Chinese exports until the end of 2008); export growth has been slower on 
the Japanese market, which was already ‘quota free’. China is now, by far, the first 
exporter of textiles and clothing on all major industrialized markets. 
However, Vietnam has also benefited (as have other major Asian exporters) from the 
new international context for these products (although the USA has imposed quotas 
within the USBTA): it now ranks sixth (even fifth, if Hong Kong is considered to be 
part of China) amongst Asian exporters to the EU + USA + Japanese market and its 
exports have grown at a strong pace over recent years (as has its market share).  
As Vietnam joined the WTO at the beginning of 2007, it can be expected that its exports 
growth rate could even increase, as they will no longer be subject to quotas (although 
the EU has applied anti-dumping measures to Vietnamese shoes exports since 2006 and 
the USA have threatened to do the same on textiles and clothing). However, joining the 
WTO also means eliminating all export subsidies. Thus, as from June 2006, when 
Decision 126 replaced Decision 55 (2003), the textile and garment industry has no 
longer been eligible to receive preferential state credits from the Vietnam Development 
Bank (VDB). 
In any case, the Asian low-income countries’ gain on textiles and clothing confirm that 
these countries have relatively similar low labour costs and high overall competitiveness 
for these products. This is not the case for other important exporters (Mexico and North 
African countries), which are generally middle-income countries that have lost 
considerable ground in recent years. 
5 Conclusion 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Vietnam was still recovering from three decades of 
devastating war – first, with France, then with the USA, followed by a rising tension 
with China that culminated in a war at the border in 1979. It was also suffering from an 
embargo imposed by the USA (which lasted until 1993), and which also prevented the 
World Bank (as well as other donors) from bringing aid to the country. The boat people 
leaving Vietnam at the turn of the 1970s, because of political pressure and the disastrous 
economic situation, contributed to reinforcing the country’s isolation.  
A quarter of a century later, the economic improvement is remarkable, as is the 
integration into the world economy. Vietnam has been able to make inroads on world 
markets and can no longer be considered a ‘sitting duck’ waiting to be picked off by 
China, armed with a huge pool of cheap labour (Bhalla 1998, quoted by Ahearne et al. 
2006). As has always been the case, the sustainability of Vietnam’s growth path is 
intimately linked to the economic situation in China, and to the evolution of China’s 
economic specialization.  
China is undoubtedly both a serious competitor and a very important economic partner 
(Vo 2005). One of the main challenges for Vietnam’s industry, therefore, is to pursue a 
more offensive strategy towards China, as its neighbour will probably be the main 
engine of the world economy in the coming years. Vietnam needs to diversify its 
exports to China (which currently consist of oil and agricultural products only), while 
industrial goods dominate imports.    11
However, the impact of Vietnam’s WTO accession on its industrialization strategy must 
not be underestimated. In order to add greater value to its exports, this country needs to 
invest heavily in new technologies and raise productivity. It also needs to improve 
domestic support industries in order to provide inputs to the rapidly growing industries. 
While private and foreign firms are very active in labour-intensive industries, they 
import a significant part of their inputs. The government plans to reinforce the state-
owned sector in order to stimulate the production of upstream industries (steel, 
petrochemicals, refining and fertilizers) as well as to develop industrial chains (Cao and 
Tran 2005). This strategy will have to abide by the rules of the WTO, and exports and 
import substitution subsidies will be totally eliminated in the next few years.  
In order to strengthen their position, state-owned enterprises will have to attract foreign 
investment. This could prove difficult in the case of scale-intensive industries where 
these enterprises are more exposed to international competition from Japan, Korea and, 
increasingly, China.  
Ultimately, although WTO regulations and the competition from China might make it 
more difficult for Vietnam to follow the East Asian path, Vietnam might nonetheless 
enjoy the benefit of being a late starter (especially at the Asian level), as stated by 
Gerschenkron (1966): ‘One can say that in a backward country, there exists a 
prerequisite to industrial development which the advanced countries did not have at its 
disposition, that is the existence of the more advanced countries as source of 
technological assistance, skilled labour and capital goods.’   
At the moment, unlike other Asian emerging countries, Vietnam does not participate 
actively in the swiftly developing regional production networks, a situation that might 
change with the rise of electronics exports. Vietnam increasingly emerges as an 
alternative destination for the multinationals of this sector, as illustrated by Intel’s 
decision to build a chip assembly and testing plant in this country, and the appearance of 
outsourcing activities. This move could help Vietnam to join Asian countries in the 
‘Asian integrated circuit’, which could prove Gerschenkron right.   12
Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Methodology 
Cos Cos indicator 
The methodology is taken from Van Beers and Biessen (1996), who based their work on 
an indicator proposed by Linnemann (1966). 
The Cos indicator is used for measuring parallelism between export structures. In order 
to compare export structures to UE and USA from country i to country j, we considered 
vectors Eik and Ejk for k = 1,...,n (n are the 263 items of CICI 3 digits) that represent the 
exports of the different countries. The cosine of the angle between these two vectors 
evolves between 0 (total dissimilarity) to 1 (similarity). 
Revealed comparative advantage 
The comparative advantage indicator answers the question: ‘What are the strong points 
and the weak points of an economy?’ 
Instead of relative export structures, as in the classic Balassa (1965) method, the 
analytical indicator used here is based on the share of the total trade balance and takes 
into account the size of each country’s market.  
The formulas are described below, with Vijk indicating the flow from exporting country 
i, to importing country j for product k. The summations of the various indices are given 
as: 
Xik = Vi.k  Exports from country i of product k 
Xi. = Vi..  Exports from country i of all goods  
Mjk = V.jk  Imports by country j of product k 
Mj. = V.j.   Imports of country j of all goods  
Wk = V..k   World trade of product k 
W. = V...  World trade of all goods  
For country i and product k, the balance is first calculated in relation to GDP at current 
exchange rate Y, giving (in thousandths): 
















The contribution of product k to the trade balance, in relation to GDP, is defined by: 
fik = yik - gik * yi 
where: 
gik =  Xik + Mik 
Xi. + Mi. 
 





In addition, it is necessary to eliminate the influence of changes that are not specific to 
the country in question but result from the evolution of the importance of the product in 
world trade. In relation to a base year (r), the flows X and M in the other years (n) are 
adjusted by multiplying them all by: 
e
n
i =  W
r






The comparative advantage indicator f′ is therefore calculated using world weights for 
the base year (r). For this year, it is identical to the relative contribution f. For the other 
years (n), the difference is all the greater the more world trade in product k diverges 
from the average tendency for all merchandise. 
Comparative advantages are calculated for individual products at the most detailed level 
of the CHELEM sectoral classification. The advantage by chain or by stage or 
production is then calculated by summing. 
Source: www.cepii.fr (accessed 10 May 2007). 
Appendix 2: Statistical sources 
Foreign trade 
Three types of foreign trade data are used in this paper: international databases, 
industrialized countries’ imports, and foreign direct investment. 
International databases 
We use the CHELEM IT database built by CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’informations internationals, based in Paris).  
CHELEM-IT brings together trade flows (goods), which are broken-down into 71 
product categories. These trade figures are given in current US$ (millions), and are 
available from 1967. Trade statistics for flows between geographic zones (countries and 
country groups) are provided for each year, and for each product category, in a single, 
‘harmonized’ matrix.   14
Industrialized countries’ imports 
European Union (15): Eurostat, HS 2 Classification   
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, accessed in May 2007). 
 
USA: US International Trade Commission: CTCI 3 digit Classification 
(www.usitc.gouv, accessed in May 2007).  
 
Japan:   Global Trade Atlas   
 (http://www.gtis.com/gta/, accessed in May 2007). 
 
Vietnam:   General Statistical Office (GSO)  
 
China:   Statistical Yearbook 
 
Foreign direct investment (Vietnam) 
 
Ministry of Planning and Investment: statistics on FDI (committed and disbursed), with 
breakdown by country origin of investors.    15
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Investment (disbursed)  Investment (committed) 
Amount 
(US$ bn) 




Share of total 
(%) 
 Total  6761  25.4  100.0  57.3  100.0 
1 Japan  724  4.8  18.9  7.1  12.3 
2 Singapore  447  3.6  14.2  8.0  14.0 
3 Taiwan  1547  2.9  11.4  8.0  14.0 
4 Korea  1246  2.6  10.2  6.1  10.6 
5 Hong  Kong  375  2.1  8.3  4.6  8.0 
  Total top 5  4339  16.0  62.9  33.8  59.0 





Table 2:  Five main revealed comparative advantages/disadvantages of Vietnam and China in 
2004 (in 1/1000 of GDP) 
Vietnam China 
Comparative advantage  Comparative advantage 
1. Oil (crude)  104.5 1. Computers  27.8
2. Shoes and leather products   84.7 2. Manufactured products nec  19.7
3. Clothing  53.4 3. Shoes and leather products  19.1
4. Knitwear  32.9 4. Clothing  14.9
5. Meat  29.2 5. Knitwear  12.6
Comparative disadvantage  Comparative disadvantage 
1. Oil (refined)  -64.0 1. Electronic components  -27.8
2.Yarn and fabric  -46.7 2. Oil (crude)  -20.3
3. Iron and steel  -32.7 3. Specialized machinery  -11.9
4. Plastic products  -24.7 4. Chemical organic products  -10.7
5. Specialized machinery  -21.2 5. Plastic products  -10.1
Source: CEPII/Chelem. 
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Table 3:  Revealed comparative advantages of Vietnam and major Asian exporters (2004) (Unit: 
1/1000 of GDP) 
 Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  China  Vietnam  Korea  Taiwan 
Cement 0.4  0.1  0.4 0.7 0.9 0.2 -0.6  0.3 
Ceramics -0.4  -0.5  -1.9 0 1.7 2.9 -0.6  -0.9 
Glass 0.4  -1.4  -0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -1.1  -2 
Iron Steel  -10.5  -18.5  -14 -21.2 -8.4 -32.7 -3.9  -4.3 
Tubes -1.9  -4.2  -0.7 -1.6 -0.1 -4.6 1.3  1.3 
N.fer. metals  0.9  -15.6  -1.1 -9.7 -4.7 -10.3 -5.3  -11.6 
Clothing -0.2  -1.9  -10 -1.6 -0.1 -46.7 8.2  23.5 
Knitwear 8.5  1.5  13.4 5.8 14.9 53.4 -0.7  0.6 
Carpets 6.6  5.3  11 10.4 12.6 32.9 0.9  2.6 
Leather 0.1  -0.7  0.4 1.5 5.4 3.7 1.2  2.6 
Wood art  5  6.4  1.5 8.1 19.1 84.7 -0.1  1.3 
Furniture 8.5  13.6  1.7 2 1.5 0.4 -1  -0.9 
Paper 5.8  10.4  3.5 5.2 9.3 26.8 -0.5  3.3 
Printing 2.7  -8.7  -5 -2.7 -3.9 -7.1 0  -2.3 
Misc. man. art.  -0.2  -1  -1.2 -0.5 0.4 -1.4 0.1  0.1 
Metall. struct.  0.6  -2.6  -1.4 -0.5 19.7 0.9 -1.3  11.4 
Misc. hardw.  0  0.8  -1.4 1.1 0.4 -0.8 0.4  -0.1 
Engines -7.1  -12.7  -6.4 -9 7 -6 0.5  20.9 
Agric. equip.  -11.1  -10.1  -5.9 -3.8 -4.4 -13.8 -2.2  -8.9 
Machine tools  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2 -0.9 0 -0.9 -0.1  0.1 
Constr. equip  -2.7  -7.5  -3.2 -8.6 -5.2 -8.7 -2  -0.3 
Spec. mach.  -5  -4.5  -1.4 -4.1 -1.7 -8.6 2.4  -2.4 
Arms -8.6  -13.5  -9.4 -16.4 -11.9 -21.2 -4  -12.4 
Precis. instr.  -0.2  -0.1  0 -0.1 0.1 0 -0.5  -0.6 
Clock making  -2.1  -4.3  -6.5 -5.8 -3.1 -6.1 -6.5  -13 
Optics -0.1  -0.3  0.8 0.9 1.1 0.1 -0.1  -0.5 
Elec. compon.  0.6  -6.1  0.5 1.5 -8.8 -0.2 -2.1  8.8 
Consum. electr.  -3.4  -36.2  64.8 -14.1 -27.8 -3.6 -0.6  -3.2 
Telecom. equip.  8.3  41.5  3.4 13.1 14.1 -0.5 4.8  4.6 
Comput. equip.  -3.9  30.3  5.5 8.1 5.9 -8.5 32.6  10.8 
Domesticel. ap.  7.3  88.7  61.9 34.9 27.8 -10.5 18.1  38.1 
Elect. equip  -0.6  1.8  -0.5 4.6 6.7 -0.2 3  0.4 
Electr. appar.  -0.1  -6.7  7.4 2.3 1.1 -0.2 -1.9  1.5 
Vehic. compon.  -1.5  -25.7  2.2 -6.7 2.6 -2.7 -6.8  14.5 
Cars/cycles -4.6  -10.1  -1.7 -9.6 -3.7 -4.9 3.7  2.3 
Comm. vehic.  -5.9  -13.5  -5.1 1.3 -0.2 -7.6 33  3.5 
Ships -2.5  -5  -2.2 4.8 0.3 -9.9 2  -2.1 
Aeronautics -1.5  -6.2  -0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.7 18.5  0.7 
B.inor.chemic. -1.2  -8.9  -3.4 -3.7 -3.8 -18.6 -2.3  -4.5 
Fertilizers -1.5  -4.7  -2.2 -2.6 1.6 -2.5 -2.2  -2.9 
B.org. chemic.  -1.6  -3.2  -2.7 -2.7 -0.5 -9.4 -0.1  -0.2 
Paints -10.3  -0.9  -6.5 -5.7 -10.7 -6 0.1  -11.5 
Toiletries -2.5  -2.1  -3.8 -4.6 -1.2 -7.8 -2.1  -3.8 
Pharm.  prod. -2.9  2.6 -5.1 -3.2 -1.6 -4.1 -2.6  -5.9 
Plastics -1.2  -5.4  -5.7 -4.1 0.4 -8.7 -2.1  -4 
Plastic articl.  -2  -1.4  -1.4 -0.4 -1.9 -6.3 1.5  3.9 
Rubber/tyres -6.3  -9.3  -12.4 -1.3 -10.1 -24.7 9.6  18.3 
Iron ores  0.7  0.9  -1.3 3.4 0.9 1 2.4  2.1 
Non fer. ores  -1.4  -5.2  4.5 -1.7 -7.7 0 -4.7  -5.3 
Unproc. miner.  9.5  -0.1  -3.2 -0.2 -5.3 1.1 -4.8  -2.4 
Coals -1  -1.2  -0.3 0 0.1 0.2 -0.8  -1.7 
Crude oil  13.2  -3.3  -1.9 -0.3 1.8 8.1 -6.4  -9.4 
Natural gas  3.4  16.8  -20.9 -2.3 -20.3 104.5 -47.5  -43.4 
Coke 27.3  38.2  -2.7 0.6 -1.3 -0.4 -13  -8.3 
Ref. petr. prod.  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 0 2.2 -0.1 -0.3  -0.2 
Electricity -17.8  -17.2  -23.6 3.6 -4 -64 1.7  7 
Cereals 0  0.1  0 -0.1 0.2 0 0  0 
Othed.agr.pr -2.1  -4.7 -6.2 5.5 -0.6 3.2 -3.1  -3.4 
Cereal prod.  -0.9  -10.3  6.2 3 -2.3 23.5 -1.9  -3.3 
Fats 4.4  15.4  0.1 7.9 -5.8 0 -3.5  -3.7 
Meat -0.4  0.1  -0.7 -0.2 0.2 -1.4 -0.1  -0.2 
Pres. meat  12.1  28.9  -0.9 -1.8 -2.7 -4.7 -1.1  -1.6 
Pres. fruits  3.6  -2.9  0.8 5.1 0.4 29.2 -3.4  1.7 
Sugar 1.1  -0.1  2.1 11.4 1.5 8.5 -0.1  0.2 
Animal food  0  -3  -0.9 3.2 1.3 -0.8 -0.3  -1.3 
Beverages -0.5  1  -0.9 2.9 0 0 -0.5  -0.6 
Manuf. tobac  -2.9  -1.6  -3.5 -0.4 -0.2 -3.5 -1  -0.8 
Jewel./w. art  -0.1  -0.6  0 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.3  -1 
N. mon gold  0.2  0.1  -1.3 -0.2 0 -2.6 0.2  -1.4 
N.e.s. prod  0.5  3.8  0.6 5.8 1 1 0.7  -1.8 
Source: CEPII/Chelem. 
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Table 4  Ten main products traded between Vietnam and China in 2004 (%) 





Products %  Cumulat. 
% 
1. Oil  57.7  57.7  1. Refined oil  14.5  14.5 
2. Coal  7.3  65.0  2. Yarn and fabric  11.7  26.2 
3. Rubber products  4.5  69.5 3.  Fertilizers  10.9  37.1 
4. Other agric. products  3.4  72.9 4.  Iron  and  steel  10.7  47.8 
5. Agricultural prod. nec  3.3  76.2  5. Engines  5.1  52.9 
6. Non ferrous ore  2.5  78.7  6. Specialized machinery  2.9  55.8 
7. Organic chemical prod.  2.2  80.9  7. Other agric. products  2.7  58.5 
8. Iron ore  1.9  82.8  8. Hardware  2.7  61.2 
9.  Leather  1.6 84.4  9.  Leather  2.4 63.6 
10. Yarn and fabric  1.0  85.4  10. Electrical appliances  2.1  65.7 





Table 5  Number of industries where the share of the US market has increased/decreased 




China Vietnam  Thailand 
Increase 210 175 137 
Decrease 7 15 33 
Not relevant  46 73 93 
Total 263 263 263 
Source: Computed by the authors from USITC data (www.usitc.gov). 
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Table 6  US, EU and Japanese clothing imports from Vietnam and major Asian exporters (Unit: 
million dollars) 







1. China         
Total  28069 29098 35254 41869 55315 62476 +122.6 
EU 7486  8810  11578 14322 21092 23934 +219.7  31.4
USA  6416 7070 8667 10685 16774 19865 +209.6  27.1
Japan  14167 13218 15009 16862 17448 18678 +131.8  83.4
2.  Bangladesh             
Total  4471 4359 5302 6518 6686 8636 +93.2 
EU  2527 2583 3515 4621 4400 5811 +130.0  7.6
USA  1929 1757 1759 1871 2268 2808 +45.6  3.8
Japan  15 18 28 26 18 18 +20.0  0.0
3.  India             
Total  3862 4208 4839 5443 7233 8229 +113.1 
EU  1979 2186 2688 3079 4028 4824 +143.8  6.3
USA  1774 1939 2059 2256 3064 3235 +82.4  4.4
Japan  109 83 92 107 141 171 +56.9  0.2
4. Hong Kong               
Total  4382 6129 6131 6354 5672 6052 +38.1 
EU  2328 2208 2379 2440 2121 3200 +37.5  4.2
USA  1994 3873 3708 3863 3507 2799 +40.4  3.8
Japan  60 48 44 51 45 53 -11.7  0.2
5.  Indonesia             
Total  4016 3590 3815 4169 4476 5613 +39.8 
EU  1607 1391 1537 1662 1492 1812 +12.8  2.4
USA  2203 2050 2153 2390 2868 3666 +66.4  5.0
Japan  205 149 125 117 115 135 -34.1  0.2
6.  Vietnam             
Total  1261 1988 3413 3839 4110 5052 +300.6 
EU  689 656 591 788 857 1285 +86.5  1.7
USA 47  873  2337 2503 2664 3152 +6606.4  4.3
Japan  525 459 484 548 588 616 +17.3  0.8
Note: ‘Total’ means the sum of total exports to the EU, USA, and Japan. 
Source: Eurostat, USITC and Global Trade Statistics.   21
Figure 1:  Vietnamese and Chinese development trajectories  
Source: 1950–2000 Maddison (n.d.); from 2000, national statistics (China and Vietnam). 
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Figure 2:  Evolution of market shares of Vietnam compared with major Asian exporters 
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Figure 4  Share of manufactured products in total exports and in exports to China for Vietnam 
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Figure 5:  Proximity of China’s export structure with Vietnam, Thailand and Korea, 2001–06 
 
Proximity of exports with China


















Proximity of exports with China  
on the US market (2001–06) 
Note: The indicator evolves between 0 (total dissimilarity) to 1 (total similarity). 
Sources: Computed by the authors from USITC and Eurostat (CTCI 3 digits). 
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